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IMPUTING ACTIVITIES FROM AGENT TO
PROPERTY OWNER AS PRINCIPAL
— by Neil E. Harl*
In recent years, few issues have been more perplexing in farm estate and business
planning than the circumstances under which activities of an agent, such as a farm
manager, are imputed to the property owner as principal.1  Enactment of 15-year
installment payment of federal estate tax2 and special use valuation in 19763 and the
family owned business exclusion in 19974 (which was converted from an exclusion to a
deduction in 1998)5 have added to the urgency of the problem.
Actually, there are three rules on imputation of activities from an agent to a property
owner6— (1) the general rule under which activities of an agent are imputed to the
principal (property owner),7 (2) the rule for situations routed through I.R.C. § 1402 in
which imputation is blocked,8 an  (3) the passive loss rule under which the presence of
a paid manager or agent destroys the principal’s own record of involvement.9
History of the issue
The 1955 case of Webster Corp. v. Commissioner,10 established the rule that activities
of a farm manager are imputed to the property owner.
Some time before 1945, the family of C. Douglas Dillon acquired five farms in Iowa
totaling 1,725.5 acres.  The farms were located in Calhoun, Humboldt, Greene, Kossuth
and Hamilton Counties.  Dillon was a Wall Street investment banker and served as
Secretary of the Treasury in the Kennedy Administration beginning in 1961.  In 1945,
the farms were conveyed to the Webster Corporation, formed under Delaware law.11
In less than five years, the corporation was subjected to an IRS audit.  IRS was
convinced the corporation had too much passive investment income—and thus had
violated the personal holding company rules.12
The corporation defended on the grounds that the income was business income, not
rents.  Each of the five farms was under a crop share lease.  Farmers National Company
of Omaha was the manager under an agency agreement on each of the farms.
Although the Tax Court did not articulate it in so many words, to have a business
generally requires that the operation bear the risks of production and the risks of price
change (which is accomplished with a share lease) and someone be involved
significantly in management.  The court stated—
“…where the owner…receives a percentage of the crop, takes an active part in the
operation by reserving and exercising the right of detailed supervision and direction
of the operation of the farm…the farmer appears to be in some category other than
that of a tenant, and the money which [the landowner] received appears to be more
in the nature of income from their own use of their own land than rent….”13
Thus, the corporation sidestepped the personal holding company tax.  As a general rule,
the activities of a farm manager are imputed to the landowner.  Without the strong
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record of involvement by the farm manager, the Dillon family
would likely have lost the case.
The Tax Court case, decided in 1955,14 was appealed to the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals and affirmed in a brief opinion
in 1957.15
Losing social security benefits
In the early 1960s, the Internal Revenue Service and the
Social Security Administration apparently concluded16 that the
Webster Corp. case should be applied more broadly including
the area of liability for self-employment tax and loss of social
security benefits from too much earned income.  Farm
managers were concerned because some of their clients under
share leases were losing social security benefits—and paying
self-employment (social security) tax—because of the high
level of involvement by the farm manager.
The upshot was that a group of concerned farm managers
expressed concerns to Washington in 1974, asking for relief.
The Congress responded with an amendment to Section 1402 of
the Internal Revenue Code. The 1974 amendment17 added 15
words to the Internal Revenue Code section levying the tax on
self-employment income.  The new language barred imputation
of activities of an agent, such as a farm manager, to a property
owner.  The amendment specified that material participation by
an owner or tenant is to be determined “without regard to any
activities of an agent of such owner or tenant….”18  That entire
passage, however, only applies to those producing “agricultural
or horticultural commodities.”19  Thus, imputation of activities
of a farm manager as agent to the landowner was barred—if the
issue is routed through Section 1402.  That solved a pressing
problem for farm managers.
Interestingly, the language was added by the Senate Finance
Committee to a bill, H.R. 8217, entitled “Vessels—Equipment
and Repairs—Exemption from Duty.”  That touched off a
lengthy, and at times acrimonious, debate in the House of
Representatives on germaneness.  But it passed on July 31,
1974, and was signed by President Nixon on August 7, 1974—
two days before he resigned the presidency.  In debate in the
House it was conceded that the amendment was triggered by
the Webster case—and that the Social Security Administration
had followed the view “since 1961” that activities of an agent
counted.
In explanation of the amendment, the House managers
stated—
EXCLUSION FROM SOCIAL SECURITY COVERAGE
OF CERTAIN FARM RENTAL INCOME
In 1956, Congress enacted legislation providing social
security coverage for farm rental income of a landowner
when the landowner materially participates in the
production of the commodities raised on his land.  Several
years after this provision was enacted, there were court
decisions which held that material participation by the
landowner could be established through the actions of his
agent, and the Social Security Administration has
conformed with these court decisions since 1961.
A problem has arisen in the case of landowners who enter
into an agreement with a professional farm management
company or other person who has the responsibility to
choose a tenant and to manage and supervise the farm
operation.  In such a situation, the landowner often does
ot consider himself to be participating in the operation of
the farm and views his income as investment income rather
than income from farm self-employment.
In order to correct this situation, the Senate added an
amendment to the bill which would exclude from coverage
under social security farm rental income received by a
landowner under an agreement between the landowner and
another person under which the other person is to manage
and supervise the production of commodities on the land if
there is no personal participation in the operation of the
farm by the landowner.
The amendment I have offered, while it differs
technically from the Senate amendment, has the same
general purpose and effect.  It would restore the original
intention of the provision covering farm rental income
under the social security system in cases in which the
landowner does not materially participate in the operation
of the farm.
I wish to emphasize that this amendment makes no
change in the law with regard to the coverage under the
social security system of farm rental income in situations
where the landowner does materially participate in the
production of commodities on his land, which of course
includes lease arrangements which provide for such
material participation as in the past.  The amendment is
limited to excluding farm rental income only in instances
in which the landowner completely turns over the
management of his land to an agent, such as a professional
farm management company and does not materially
participate in the farming operation himself on that land.20
The third rule, limited to passive losses, was enacted in
1986.21  The statute made no specific reference to the matter of
imputation but the temporary regulations contained a statement
that—
“An individual’s services performed in the management of
an activity shall not be taken into account in determining
whether such individual is treated as materially
participating in such activity for the taxable year…unless,
for such taxable year—
“(A) No person (other than such individual) who performs
services in connection with the management of the activity
receives compensation…in consideration for such services;
and
“(B) No individual performs services in connection with
the management of the activity that exceed (by hours) the
amount of such services performed by such individual.”22
C nsequences of the rules
The third rule is limited to passive losses and has no effect
b yond that provision.
The second rule, barring imputation, applies to all situations
which are routed through Section 1402 of the Internal Revenue
Code.  That includes (1) the line between rent and business
income for purposes of self-employment tax,23 (2) eligibility of
land for special use valuation as to the material participation
test24 and (3) the material participation test for purposes of the
family-owned business deduction.25  Note that the second rule,
barring imputation, does not apply for purposes of determining
whether an asset is a passive asset and thus is not included in
the calculations of value of a qualified family-owned business
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interest.26  For that purpose, the general rule is applicable with
imputation of activities of an agent to the principal.
Wherever there is no statutory or regulatory provision routing
the question of involvement through Section 1402 of the
Internal Revenue Code, the general rule applies.27
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
     GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
CAMPER. The debtor claimed a pop-up camper as an exempt
household good under Me. Rev. Stat. § 422. The court applied a
functional nexus test that required eligible household goods to
contribute to the daily use, maintenance or upkeep of the
debtor’s household. Under that test, the court held that the
camper did not qualify as an exempt household good. In re
Schreiber, 231 B.R. 17 (Bankr. D. Me. 1999).
EARNED INCOME CREDIT. The debtor claimed an
exemption under La. Rev. Stat. § 46:111 for an income tax
refund resulting from earned income tax credit. The state
exemption included “all assistance” which was defined as
“money payments under” the state public welfare and
assistance programs. The court held that the EIC was not
eligible for the exemption because the EIC was not a money
payment under the state public welfare and assistance
programs. In re Collins, 170 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 1999).
HOMESTEAD. The debtor filed for bankruptcy in California
where the debtor had been residing for the greater portion of the
pre-petition 180 days. The debtor claimed an exemption for a
homestead located in Michigan under the California homestead
exemption. The court held that the California exemption could
apply to a residence located in another state because the intent
of the state exemption was to provide a place for the debtor and
family to reside. In re Arrol, 170 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 1999),
aff’g unrep. D. Ct. op. aff’g, 207 B.R. 662 (Bankr. N.D. Calif.
1997).
   CHAPTER 12    -ALM § 13.03[8].*
DISMISSAL. The debtor filed for Chapter 12 hours before
the commencement of an unlawful detainer action against the
debtor and the debtor’s mother. The debtor’s mother’s farm had
b en sold at foreclosure and the unlawful detainer action was
filed to force the debtor and mother to vacate the property. The
ebt r had few assets, only a small amount of debt and no
income. The plaintiff in the unlawful detainer action filed a
motion o convert the case to Chapter 7 for fraud because the
debtor was not a family farmer and failed to list assets on the
schedules. The court held that the failure to list several assets
was not sufficient evidence of fraudulent intent; however, the
court dismissed the case for bad faith because the debtor’s only
reason for the bankruptcy filing was to block the unlawful
detainer trial. The debtor was also required to pay the plaintiff’s
attorney fees associated with the bankruptcy case motions and
the delay in the state action trial, and the debtor was enjoined
from filing any bankruptcy petition for 180 days. In re Massie,
231 B.R. 249 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1999).
   FEDERAL TAXATION   -ALM § 13.03[7].*
TAX LIEN. The debtors had transferred their residence to
their minor son in trust. However, no gift tax or trust returns
were ever filed, the debtors claimed all deductions associated
with th  residence, the debtors paid all expenses associated with
the residence, and the debtors claimed individual ownership of
the resid ce on loan applications and tax returns. The court
held that, although the trust was legitimate under state law
because it was established well before any of the bankruptcy
claims, including the tax claims, arose, the debtor’s actions
